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NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiff, as purchaser under a standard form earnest
money receipt and offer to purchase (hereinafter the "Agreement"), commenced this action against Defendants, as sellers
under the Agreement, seeking to compel the Defendants to convey
to Plaintiff title to certain improved real property (hereinafter sometimes the "Property") purchased by Plaintiff from
Defendants under and described in the Agreement.

In addition,

Plaintiff requested the Trial Court to remove certain encumbrances on the Property within a time certain and upon failure
of Defendants to do so, then, in the alternative, to offset
the monetary amount of such encumbrances against the balance
of the purchase price owed by Plaintiff to Defendants.
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
The Trial Court concluded that the Agreement was
too vague and ambiguous to be binding upon Defendants and,
therefore, not capable of specific performance.

The Trial

Court entered judgment dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint and
ordering Defendants to return to Plaintiff the $500.00 consideration paid by him to Defendants at the time of execution of the
Agreement.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks an order reversing the judgment of
the Trial Court and directing entry of judgment for Plaintiff
compelling Defendants to convey title to the Property to
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Plaintiff and requiring Defendants within a time certain to
remove certain encumbrances on the Property.

In addition,

Plaintiff requests that upon Defendants failure to do so, then,
in the alternative, to allow offset of the monetary amount of
the encumbrances against the balance of the purchase price
owed by Plaintiff to Defendants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During the spring of 1976, Plaintiff was contacted
by Richard Lambert (hereinafter "Lambert"), a real estate agent
acting as agent for Defendants and a loan officer at Zions
First National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah (hereinafter "Zions
Bank"), regarding the sale of certain real property located
at the intersection of Hillview Drive and Ninth East Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah.

Lambert informed Plaintiff that

Defendants would be in the process of constructing three fourplex units on such property and that he, Lambert, was attempting
to arrange a sale to Plaintiff on behalf of Defendants of
one of the fourplex units (sometimes hereinafter the term
"fourplex" is used to describe the property purchased by
Plaintiff under the Agreement) •
On or about April 23, 1976, Lambert presented Plaintiff with the Agreement (Exhibit 1.) which he had prepared
as agent for Defendants (R. 56).
among other things, for

The Agreement provided,

(i) the sale of real property situated

at "the corner of Hillview and Ninth East", Salt Lake City,
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Utah, and (ii) a $500.00 deposit was to be paid and held for
application toward payment of a $70,000 total purchase price.
The Agreement also included the words "terms to be arranged",
which terms, according to the Agreement and understanding
thereof by Plaintiff, Defendants and Lambert, meant that
Plaintiff was to arrange his own permanent financing of the
Property and with that financing to pay the Defendants the
balance due at the closing of title.

Defendants paid Lambert

a commission for arranging this sale of the Property to Plaintiff

(R. 68-69).
Within approximately two or three weeks

after the

execution date of the Agreement, Plaintiff sought financing
from Zions Bank for a loan in an amount of eighty percent (80%)
of the purchase price of the Property and received a commitment
from Zions Bank for that financing (R. 58).

Based solely upon

Plaintiff's financing commitment from Zions Bank, Defendants
received from Zions Bank a loan for the construction of a fourplex on the Property (R. 103, 104 and Exhibit 16).
No completion date for construction of the fourplex
on Plaintiff's Property was inserted into the Agreement at
the instruction of Defendant Michael Alvey to Lambert.

Lambert

was told that the fourplex could be completed on Plaintiff's
Property within three months of the execution date of the
Agreement, but since it might take as long as four months to
complete, he should not put a completion date in the Agreement
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(R. 123, 127).

Notwithstanding the fact that the fourplex

was to have been completed on Plaintiff's Property within three
or four months and title closed after April 23, 1976, Plaintiff
received no communications from Defendants until after March 23,
1977.

However, during the period from April 23, 1976 to

March 23, 1977, Plaintiff continuously observed the construction
of the fourplex unit on his Property.

On numerous occasions

Plaintiff complained to Lambert regarding Defendants' dilatory
construction of such fourplex.
On March 23, 1977, Plaintiff received a letter
bearing that date and advising him that the fourplex unit
being built on the Property would be ready to close within two
or three weeks.

Such letter requested that Plaintiff deposit

$13,500 in a non-interest bearing escrow account at Zions
Bank as a downpayment for his fourplex unit.

Plaintiff had

not theretofore been advised that such a deposit would be
required and it was Plaintiff's understanding that such $13,500
was due and payable at closing of title to the Property.

After

repeated unsuccessful attempts by Plaintiff to communicate
with Defendants to determine the basis upon which such deposit
was being requested by Defendants, Plaintiff learned that such
deposit was to evidence his financial ability to complete the
closing of title to his Property.

Despite Plaintiff's dis-

agreement with Defendants' demand for such deposit, and in
anticipation of the purchase and sale of the Property being
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closed within two or three weeks of March 23, 1977, Plaintiff
did deposit $13,500 with Zions Bank on April 8, 1977-(R. 59-61).
From April 8, 1977 to approximately May 20, 1977,
Plaintiff drove by his Property not less than once a week and
observed that the fourplex unit being constructed on his
Property was not complete and ready for rental and closing of
title, and very little, if any work, was being done in order
to complete construction.

On or about May 20, 1977, Plaintiff

withdrew the $13,500 sum from the escrow account, not because
he did not intend to complete purchase of the fourplex unit,
but rather because of the construction delays on Defendants'
part, his inability to contact Defendants and the fact that
the funds were in a non-interest bearing account (R.62).
After more unsuccessful attempts to communicate
with Defendants, Plaintiff brought this action for specific
performance by Defendants of the terms to be performed by the
Agreement.
ARGUMENT
Introduction
The Trial Court concluded that:
1.

The Agreement was "vague, ambiguous, uncerl:ain,

contingent and incomplete on its face, and • • • not capable
of specific performance"

(R.42) because no specific fourplex

was agreed upon by Plaintiff and Defendants and because the
phrase in the Agreement of "terms to be arranged" was not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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discussed, negotiated or agreed to, but was left to future
agreement"

(R. 41, 42).
2.

The Plaintiff failed to establish a valid

legally enforceable contract because he had not complied with
its terms by performing or offering to perform the obligations
to be performed by him under the Agreement (R.42).

This

conclusion was based upon the Court's findings that Plaintiff
had never obtained financing for the purchase of the Property
and had never tendered to Defendants the purchase price
thereof (R. 42).
It is submitted that the Court erred in its
Findings and Conclusions and that it is the prerogative and
the duty of this Court in an action in equity such as this to
review the law and the facts and to make its own findings,
substituting its judgment for that of the Trial Court if that
judgment is not supported by the evidence.
VII §9; Del Porto
Nokes

~·

~·

UTAH CONST. Art.

Nicolo, 495 P.2d 811, 812 (Utah 1972);

Continental Min. & Mill, 308 P.2d 954, 955 (Utah

1957); Crocket v. Nish, 147 P.2d 853, 854 (Utah 1944).
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS VAGUE
AND AMBIGUOUS AND NOT CAPABLE OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IN THAT
THE FOURPLEX TO BE SOLD TO PLAINTIFF WAS IDENTIFIED AND THE
PARTIES KNEW, UNDERSTOOD AND HAD AGREED AS TO THE MEANING OF
THE PHRASE "TERMS TO BE ARRANGED".
A fundamental rule of contract construction is that
the terms of the agreement or contract in question must be
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construed realistically in light of circumstances under which
it was entered into and that if the intent of the parties can
be ascertained with reasonable certainty, the Agreement must
be given effect despite the uncertainty of the language of the
Agreement.
This Court has adhered to this principle in several of
its recent decisions.

In Kier

~·

Condrack, 478 P.2d 327 (Utah

1970) an action was brought for specific performance of a contract
to sell real property.

This Court held that where the contract

is uncertain "the Trial Court could then look to the circumstances and testimony of the parties to ascertain what appeared
to be their intent and determine their obligations based
thereon."

Id. at 329.
In Continental Bank and Trust Co.

~·

~·

~·

Stewart,

291 P.2d 890 (Utah 1955), a bank, as a third party beneficiary,
brought an action against the purchaser of property based on
the purchaser's agreement to pay to the bank the debts of the
seller.

The earnest money receipt by which the purchaser had

agreed to acquire the real property did not state what debts
were to be paid by the purchaser or the time and manner of
payment.

In view of these ambiguities, this Court held that it

was proper for the trial court to consider "the situation of
the parties, the facts and circumstances surrounding the making
of the contract, the purpose of its execution and the respective
claims thereunder to ascertain what the parties intended.

Id.

at 892.
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From these decisions it is apparent that an agreement
which is vague and uncertain on its fact cannot be denied effect
where the meaning of the agreement or contract can be ascertained
from the circumstances surrounding its negotiation, execution
and the parties'conduct with respect thereto.

The Agreement

specifies the amount of the earnest money deposit, the total
purchase price of the Property, and the names of the contracting
parties.

The identity of the fourplex unit to be purchased

by Plaintiff and the meaning of the phrase "terms to be arranged"
become unequivocal and unambiguous by an analysis of circumstances surrounding negotiations, execution of the Agreement and
the parties' conduct, as shown by the pleadings on file in this
case and the evidence introduced at trial.
A.

Identity of Fourplex
At the time Plaintiff was contacted by Lambert as

agent for Defendants regarding the purchase of the fourplex,
Defendants were engaged in negotiations to obtain a parcel of
real property extending eastward from the corner of Ninth East
Street and Hillview. Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Defendants

obtained such parcel and the lots therein contained were sold
to three purchasers by Lambert pursuant to three similar
earnest money agreements (R. 93-98, 114-118).
one of such three purchasers.

Plaintiff was

At the time the three earnest

money agreements were executed, a decision had not been made
by Defendants with respect to identifying each of the three
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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lots to specified buyers (R. 97, 118).

Defendants, however,

did not rely on that fact as a basis for refusing to perform its
earnest money agreements with the two buyers other than
Plaintiff (R. 97) •

Any uncertainty in the property descriptions

did not present an obstacle to the consummation and closing
of the transactions with the other two buyers, and Defendants'
conduct in connection therewith actually established and
eliminated any question as to the identity of the fourplex to
be purchased by Plaintiff; namely, as a result of the consummation of the transactions with the other two buyers, there was
only one lot and fourplex remaining for Plaintiff to purchase.
It is anomalous under these circumstances, especially
after Defendants have admitted in their answer to entering
into the Agreement with Plaintiff (R. 9), that Defendants now
contend for the first time that there exists an uncertainty
with respect to the identity of the fourplex to be purchased
by Plaintiff.

Further, Defendant Michael Alvey testified at

trial that there was no question that one of the fourplexes was
to be sold to Plaintiff (R. 98).

Such testimony of Michael

Alvey, together with the foregoing facts, and the conduct of
Defendants, unequivocally shows that Defendants' refusal to
perform their part of the Agreement is not due to any confusion
or ambiguity with respect to the identity of the Property, but
is simply a specious excuse attempting to justify their refusal
to perform and their breach of the Agreement.
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B.

Terms to be Arranged
The circumstances surrounding execution of the Agree-

ment also dispel any contention that the Agreement is uncertain
with respect to the manner of payment.

The literal language

of the Agreement provided that the financing terms were to be
arranged.

The phrase "terms to be arranged" referred to

Plaintiff's arrangements to obtain permanent financing of the
fourplex.

such phrase in no manner whatsoever pertained to any

arrangements or agreements between Plaintiff and Defendants.
Plaintiff and Lambert, who was also a loan officer
with Zions Bank, discussed the terms of the permanent financing
prior to the execution of the Agreement by Plaintiff.

Lambert

informed Plaintiff of the terms he thought would be available
from Zions Bank based on Plaintiff's financial statement (R. 57).
After this discussion, Lambert presented the Agreement to
Defendant Michael Alvey for execution by Defendants.

Lambert

informed Defendants that the Plaintiff was going to arrange his
own financing with Zions Bank and pay Defendants the full balance
of the purchase price at the closing of title to the fourplex.
Defendants did not object to this financing arrangement with
Zions Bank (R. 123).

As further evidence of this understanding,

Plaintiff applied to Zions Bank for a loan of 80% of the
purchase price of the fourplex.

Such loan would have been

closed at the same time the construction of the fourplex was
projected to be completed.

Such action on Plaintiff's part
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regarding application for and approval of such financing is
substantiated by his own testimony (R. 58), the testimony
of Douglas Giver, a former loan officer with Zions Bank (R.
164, 165), the records of Zions Bank indicating application for
such a loan, and the fact that the application had been
presented to Zions Bank loan committee (R. 104 and Exhibit
16).
The Trial Court's conclusion that the phrase "terms
to be arranged" was left to future agreement is clearly
erroneous with proper understanding of certain facts.

The

evidence has established that Plaintiff's loan application had
to be approved by Zions Bank as a condition precedent to Zions
Bank granting a construction loan to Defendants to build Plaintiff's fourplex (R. 103, 104 and Exhibits 8, 9, 10 and 15).
Therefore, the approval by Zions Bank of the construction loan
regarding Plaintiff's fourplex removes all doubt, if indeed
any was present, regarding the meaning of the phrase "terms
to be arranged".

Such phrase was not intended to and did not

in fact have any application to Plaintiff's and Defendants'
application.
The evidence of discussions between Plaintiff and
Lambert, Defendants and Lambert, and the approval of loans
by Zions Bank for Defendants and Plaintiff, established that
Defendants did not consider any part of the Agreement to be
ambiguous.

All major aspects of the Agreement are clear and
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unambiguous.

Clearly, the position of Defendants is to take

advantage of the provisions of the Agreement prepared by their
agent Lambert because, among other reasons, Defendants had
encumbered the Property in addition to the construction loan
at Zions Bank for $55,000, for an additional $60,750 (R. 84,
85 and Exhibit 6).
A similar challenge to an agreement uncertain on its
face was rejected by this Court in Kier

~·

Condra~

supra.

The agreement under review in that case provided for payment
of the price for purchase of realty upon "terms to be negotiated."

Id. at 329.

This Court, however, agreed with the trial

court's view that "when the parties had reached an agreement
and committed themselves on the major aspects of the transaction,
that is, that defendants would sell and the plaintiff would buy
at the agreed price of $23,500

• reserving only the 'terms'

of payment, they should be obliged to act in good faith in
keeping their promises • • • But neither party should be permitted to use the reservation of 'terms' to get more than they
had promised • • • nor to renege on the bargain
As shown, the Kier case is similar on its facts to
this case on appeal.

In Kier, this Court determined that the

parties had committed themselves on the major aspects of the
transaction: that the defendants would sell, that the plaintiff
would buy at the agreed price of $23,500.

In this case we have

an agreement definite as to each of those aspects.

Defendants
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admittedly agreed to sell and Plaintiff agreed to purchase the
fourplex at a price of $70,000.

In Kier, the terms of payment

were alleged to be indefinite and unenforceable.

The $23,500

purchase price was to be "(O)n payment and terms to be
negotiated • •

Id. at

32~.

In this case the purchase price

was to be financed upon "terms to be arranged".

Despite the

Kier case, and the facts in this case, the Trial Court coneluded that there existed uncertainty and held the Agreement
incapable of specific performance.

Clearly, the Trial Court

erred in this conclusion because the application of the Kier
rationale to the facts in this case require the inseparable
conclusion that the major aspects of the Agreement had been
agreed upon, and the circumstances surrounding the execution
of the Agreement, including the parties' conduct with respect
to the Agreement, unequivocally and unambiguously identify each
and every term of the Agreement.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF HAD FAILED TO COMPLY
WITH THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT BY NOT OBTAINING NECESSARY
FINANCING OR NOT TENDERING THE PURCHASE PRICE.
The record clearly shows that Plaintiff complied in
every respect with all obligations on his part to be performed
and all requests made upon him by Defendants.

Also, Plaintiff

made any and all tenders of performance required by the Agreement or by law.
Plaintiff signed the Agreement, delivered the sum
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of $500,00 to Lambert as a deposit on the purchase price, and
contrary to his understanding of the Agreement, he complied
with Defendants' request to deposit $13,500 in a non-interest
bearing escrow account with Zions Bank.

He also applied to

Zions Bank for financing for the balance of the purchase price
and was told that he had qualified for the financing

(R. 75).

Defendants produced no evidence that Plaintiff at any time was
not ready, willing and able to perform or could not in fact
have tendered and paid the purchase price of the fourplex.
The general rule in equity regarding the tender of
performance is that even though the plaintiff has not tendered
performance, the court can decree specific performance by
the defendant by making enforcement conditional upon plaintiff's
rendering the return performance into court.

Equitable

principles do not require that the plaintiff must of necessity
make a tender before suing for specific performance, so long
as plaintiff is ready, willing and able to tender performance.
The court of equity suffered from no such
limitation of power (as compared to courts of law).
It could decree specific performance by the defendant,
and at the same time make enforcement conditional on
the plaintiff's rendering the return performance into
court (e.g. the payment of a price in money or the
delivery of a deed). If the plaintiff's performance
was one that required some continued performance
incapable of being rendered into court, the decree
might require specific performance either after full
performance by the plaintiff or by requiring it pari
passu as the plaintiff's performance proceeded.
In
many fewer cases does justice require that the plaintiff should make a tender before suing for specific
performance; and therefore tender is much less often
held to be a condition precedent to the granting of
a decree.
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SA Corbin on Contracts, §1175, P. 299.
The only evidence available to Defendant that Plaintiff
did not comply with all of Defendants' requests or which tends
to indicate that he did not intend to perform his obligations
under the Agreement is that he withdrew the $13,500 from the
escrow account at Zions Bank after having deposited the same.
However, Appellan± asserts that such escrow arrangement is not
part of the Agreement.

Assuming, arguendo, that such escrow

arrangement is a term of the Agreement, such action of withdrawing the funds is explainable and was explained at trial.
When the fourplex was not near completion at the time projected
in Defendants' letter to Plaintiff of March 23, 1977 (R. 61, 62)
and because the money was in a non-interest bearing escrow
account, Plaintiff withdrew the same.

By doing so, Plaintiff

did not intend to breach the Agreement or to not complete it
as required by him.

Instead, Plaintiff testified his action

was prompted by the combination of factors of Defendants long
delays in completion of the fourplex and the fact that such a
large sum of money was in a non-interest bearing escrow account.
In addition, Plaintiff profferred testimony at trial that he
had been informed by an employee at Zions Bank that Defendants,
without Plaintiff's permission or knowledge, had attempted to
remove the $13,500 from the escrow account prior to having
finished the construction of Plaintiff's fourplex and the closing
of title thereto.

Such testimony was excluded by the Trial

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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court, however, and it is unclear whether the exclusion was on
the basis that such profferred testimony was hearsay or
whether an inadequate foundation had been laid for its acceptance,
If excluded on the basis of hearsay, such exclusion was improper
in that the testimony, as stated at the time (R. 63), was not
being introduced for the truth of the matter asserted but simply
to show another reason why Plaintiff was withdrawing his funds
from the escrow account, and not being introduced for the truth
of the matter asserted, the testimony would obviously not be
hearsay.

In the event the testimony was excluded on grounds of

lack of a proper foundation, it is submitted that a proper
foundation was laid, or in any event, Defendants' counsel
failed to state the grounds upon which he based his objection of
lack of foundation.

The profferred testimony should have been

received.
Contrary to the finding of the Trial Court that
Plaintiff has not complied with the terms of the Agreement by
obtaining financing or tendering the purchase price, the testimony as reviewed and analyzed clearly shows that Plaintiff
has performed and has always been ready, willing and able to
perform the obligations required of him under the Agreement.
It has been Defendants who failed to perform.

Notwithstanding

Defendants' own statements, as testified to by their agent
Lambert (R. 123), that Plaintiff's fourplex would be completed
within three to four months, it was eleven months before
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Defendants notified Plaintiff that his fourplex unit would
be completed in two to three weeks after date of that notification; namely, March 23, 1977.

Furthermore, the Plaintiff's

fourplex was still not completed within that two to three week
period and remained uncompleted as long as five to six weeks
after March 23, 1977 (R. 61, 62).

Also, without any basis in

the Agreement, Defendants required Plaintiff to deposit
$13,500 in a non-interest bearing escrow account as evidence
of his ability to perform.

But Defendants failed to perform

their part of the Agreement by not timely completing Plaintiff's
fourplex.

Despite Defendants' utter lack of good faith in not

performing their obligations under the Agreement, Defendants
nevertheless raised defenses as to vagueness of the Agreement
and lack of performance on Plaintiff's part.

Proper application

of equitable principles to the facts of this case requires
and compels specific performance of the Agreement, as was
recognized by this Court in the Kier case.
We recognize the validity of the rule relied upon by
Defendants that to be enforceable a contract must be
sufficiently definite in its terms that the parties
know what is required of them. But like all rules,
which are necessarily stated in generality, it is
only applicable in the proper circumstances, where
the justice of the case requires: as a shield to
protect the party from injustice, and not as a weapon
under which to perpetrate an injustice.
Kier

~·

Condrack, supra, at 330.

To uphold the Defendants'

position in this case will allow them to use legal principles
as a "sword" to perpetrate an injustice upon Plaintiff.

The
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facts of this case compel that Plaintiff be protected and
shielded against the kind of activities Defendants and their
agent Lambert have perpetrated upon him and equitable principles
demand the same.
CONCLUSION
The precedent upon which to decide this case is found
in the holdings of Kier
Bank

~

Trust Company

~·

~·

Condrack, supra, and Continental

Stuart, supra, Id. at 892.

It is,

therefore, not only proper but obligatory to consider the
facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the Agreement
and the negotiation and actions of the Plaintiff and Defendants.
When such matters are considered, it is unequivocal that a
specific fourplex does exist and that not only was it the intent
of the Plaintiff and Defendants that such fourplex be the one
purchased by Plaintiff, but also it is the only fourplex that
could be the subject of the Agreement.

It is also unequivocal

that Plaintiff, Defendants and Lambert all were aware and
contemplated that the balance of the purchase price of the fourplex would be paid by Plaintiff at closing to title thereto
with funds he arranged by his own financing efforts.
dants admitted the Agreement in their answer.

Defen-

Defendants'

activities and conduct with respect to the Agreement for a
period in excess of a year indicates knowledge and intention
on their part that an Agreement existed under which they were
to sell a specific fourplex to Plaintiff to be totally paid for
by Plaintiff at closing. The Court, if it does not enforce the
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Agreement, would be allowing Defendants to use the defenses
raises by them as a weapon to thwart justice and fair dealings
rather than as a shield to prevent injustice as equitable
principles were intended to be used.
It is hereby requested that the Court should not let
stand the decree of the Trial Court that will allow Defendants,
who abruptly, without notice and to the detriment of Plaintiff
who had justifiably relied on the Agreement and Defendants'
conduct, refuse to abide by and specifically perform their
obligations under the Agreement.

The judgment of the Trial

court should be reversed and Defendants ordered to specifically
perform the Agreement by conveying the Property to Plaintiff,
and that if the encumbrances on the Property as shown in the
record are not removed by Defendants within a reasonable time
specified by the Court, Plaintiff be allowed an offset in the
total amount of such encumbrances against the balance of the
purchase price of the Property to be paid by him to Defendants.
DATED February 9, 1979.
Respectfully submitted:
PARSONS & CROWTHER

By~~-.,,._

~nn

Parsons
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Two copies of the foregoing brief were served upon
Defendants by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to their
attorney, Harold A. Hinsey, at 2000 Beneficial Life Tower,
36 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 9th
day of February, 1979.

~~4~
crowhei
Thomas N.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

